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INDIAN LAW-STATE JURISDICTION ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS-­
EFFECTS OF CONCURRENT STATE AND TRIBAL TAXATION ON 
INDIAN SMOKESHops--Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the 
Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most controversial issues in the area of Indian law 
is the extent of state authority on federal Indian reservations. The 
dispute is especially acute in the area of state taxation because of 
the interests at stake. The states' concerns are raising revenue and 
regulating their citizens. The Indians, on the other hand, wish to 
maintain their federally protected right to self-government and to 
enhance tribal economic development. Washington v. Confeder­
ated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation l is another attempt 
by the United States Supreme Court to define the contours of the 
respective jurisdictions. 
Smokeshops are a major enterprise for the Colville, Makah, 
and Lummi Tribes. Prior to Colville the tribes were able to sell 
cigarettes for considerably lower prices than off-reservation shops 
because no state sales tax was collected. The income that the In­
. dian tribes derived from reservation enterprises was considered to 
be exempt from state taxation because the tribes are under federal 
control and occupy federal trust lands. 2 Most of the tribes' ciga­
rette business was generated because of this exemption; their lower 
prices attracted purchasers from the surrounding localities. Each 
tribe raised significant revenue for tribal functions and services by 
placing its own tax on the sales. 3 
1. 447 U.S. 134 (1980). 
2. Indians and tribal lands originally were immune from tax because the tribes 
were considered to be distinct political communities under the exclusive control of 
Congress. The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737, 755 (1886) (Court rejected state 
efforts to impose a land tax on reservation Indians). Another asserted basis for the tax 
immunity was the federal instrumentality doctrine which exempts federal lands from 
state taxation. See United States v. Thurston County, 143 F. 287 (8th Cir. 1906). This 
doctrine was rejected in Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 150-51 
(1973). The Court has returned to the sovereignty reasoning as a basis for the immu­
nity. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1973). 
3. 447 U.S. at 145. 
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In 1972 the State of Washington imposed a tax on reservation 
sales made to nonmembers of the tribe. 4 In an attempt to enforce 
this tax, it seized untaxed cigarettes that were en route to the res­
ervations. The Indian tribes brought actions in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Washington,5 seeking de­
claratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of the state 
cigarette tax and against the state's seizure of untaxed cigarettes. 
The district court concluded that the tax was preempted by the 
tribal ordinances and would cause an impermissible interference 
with the tribal governments. 6 The state made a direct appeal from 
the three-judge panel. 7 
The United States Supreme Court upheld the state's tax on 
non tribal purchasers, using a two-tier approach. First, the Court 
examined whether the federal scheme preempted state involve­
ment. The Court found that Washington's action on the reservation 
did not conflict with any -federal statute or federally protected 
power of the tribes. Although the majority recognized that the 
state taxation scheme would deprive the tribes of business and rev­
enue, 8 it refused to find that the state's action was preempted by 
federal Indian law. No federal act authorized the tribes to market 
their tax exemption to non-Indians by enacting tribal taxing ordi­
nances, and no federal act hindered the state's ability to collect the 
sales tax from nonmembers. The mere assertion that federal policy 
encourages economic development of Indian reservations was inad­
equate to preempt a valid state tax collection function. 9 Second, 
the Court applied the infringement test, which weighed the state's 
interest in raising revenue against the interference the tax threat­
ened to have on tribal self-government. Although a tax on sales to 
non-Indians undoubtedly would cause a decline in tribal revenues, 
4. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 2.24.260 (West Cum. Supp. 1981). The tax immu­
nity is based on membership in a tribal government, not on race. A nonmember In­
dian on a reservation does not possess the same immunities afforded a member In­
dian. 447 U.S. at 160-61. See also Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390-91 
(1976). 
5. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington, 446 
F. Supp. 1339, 1346-48 (E.D. Wash. 1978), afI'd in part, rev'd in part, 447 U.S. 134 
(1980). 
6. Id. at 160-65. 
7. In addition to the cigarette tax issue, a motor vehicle tax was before the 
Court. The Court, with only Justice Rehnquist dissenting, held that the motor vehi­
cle tax could not be imposed on vehicles used both on and off the reservation. 447 
U.S. at 162-64. 
8. Id. at 154. 
9. Id. at 155-56. 
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the Court concluded that the state activity did not amount to an in­
fringement of tribal self-government. 1o 
II. BACKGROUND TO JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTE 

BETWEEN STATE AND TRIBAL AUTHORITY 

Indians have maintained a unique position in the federal 
scheme. Their lands are under the exclusive control of the federal 
government by virtue of their dependent status. ll Nevertheless, 
Indian tribes, like independent governments, have retained some 
sovereignty that can only be abridged by federal action. The states, 
however, have a significant interest in regulating lands and citizens 
within their boundaries. Indeed, because of these interests, states 
were recognized by the courts as the tribes' "deadliest enemies."12 
Initially, the courts used a territorial analysis to determine the 
extent of the states' jurisdiction over Indian reservations. Chief 
Justice Marshall, writing for the majority in Worcester v. 
Georgia,13 held that a state had no power to apply its laws within 
Indian territory.' He reasoned: 
[t]he Cherokee nation ... is a distinct community occupying its 
own' territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which 
the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of 
Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cher­
okees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with acts of 
congress. The whole intercourse between the United States and 
this nation, is, by our constitution and laws, vested in the gov­
ernment of the United States. 14 
Thus, under Worcester, the states had no power to affect ac­
tivities within the territorial confines of Indian nations because In­
dian territory was a separate entity from the surrounding state. In­
dian reservations, however, did not rise to the level of foreign 
10. Id. at 156-57. 
11. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). Chief Justice 
Marshall described the dependent status as follows: 
[t]hey may ... be denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a 
territory to which we assert a title independent of their will, which must 
take effect in point of possession when their right of possession ceases. 
Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United 
States resembles that of a ward to his guardian. 
Id. at 17. 
12. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886). 
13. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
14. Id. at 561. Despite the Court's mandate, Georgia refused to follow the or­
der. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959). 
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nations. Rather, in the nineteenth century, tribes were considered 
to be "domestic dependent nations"15 or "wards of the United 
States. "16 
Despite these labels, the government recognized that Ameri­
can Indian tribes were inherently sovereign nations. This sovereign 
status did not derive from a delegation of power by the federal 
government but represented a retention of the Indian tribes' origi­
nal independent authority.17 The Indian tribes' sovereign power 
can be limited only by treaties and congressional action. IS Federal 
action does not give power to the Indian governments but can only 
limit the realm of power the Indians originally had. As stated by 
Felix Cohen, a noted authority on Indian law: "[w]hat is not ex­
pressly limited remains within the domain of tribal sovereignty."19 
The limits already placed on tribal sovereignty by the federal 
government expanded when state authority crept onto the reserva­
tion. Despite the territorial analysis of Worcester, a state may reg­
ulate activities on Indian reservations when it has a sufficient inter­
est. 20 Absent special congressional legislation, a state does not have 
a sufficient interest and is without jurisdiction in matters involving 
only Indians in Indian territory.21 Under this legislative exception, 
Congress allowed some states to assume criminal and civil jurisdic­
tion over consenting tribes pursuant to Public Law 280. 22 Congress 
has . also permitted application of state liquor standards,23 state 
health and education laws,24 and some specified state taxes to res­
ervation activities. 25 
15. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). 
16. Id. 
17. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1940). 
18. Id. Federal power over the Indian tribes derives from only two clauses in 
the United States Constitution. "Representatives and direct taxes shall be appor­
tioned among the several states ... excluding Indians not taxed." U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 2. "Congress shall have power to ... regulate commerce with foreign nations, and 
among the several states, and with the Indian tribes." Id. § 8 (the Indian Commerce 
Clause). 
19. F. COHEN, supra note 17, at 122. 
20. Id. at 119. 
21. Id. at 120. 
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1976). One of the three statutory exceptions to the as­
sumption of jurisdiction has been read to prohibit state assertion of taxing authority. 
See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 379 (1976). See generally Goldberg, Public 
Law 280: The Limits Of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation In-dians, 22 U.C.L.A. L. 
REV. 535 (1975). 
23. 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (1976). 
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1976); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1976). 
25. 25 U.S.C. § 398c (1976) (states have jurisdiction to tax the output of mines 
and oil wells of any lessee of Indian lands). 
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On the other hand, the state may assert authority without spe­
cific congressional approval in matters involving non-Indians when 
the matters are grounded sufficiently in state jurisdiction. 26 A non­
Indian in Indian territory does not necessarily avoid state jurisdic­
tion since the state has an interest in the regulation of its citi­
zens. 27 The Supreme Court has upheld the validity of state taxes 
on personalty owned by non-Indians in Indian territory.28 Simi­
larly, the Court upheld Utah's power to tax the property of a non­
Indian railroad company within the borders of the reservation. 29 
Although a strict territorial approach was easy to apply, it 
proved unrealistic. The states could not be separated totally from 
reservation lands and Indian activities. The courts went beyond 
what Congress had permitted and recognized that states have an 
interest in certain activities, regulation of which would not jeopar­
dize any federal interests. 3o Further, the need for a new standard. 
to govern state jurisdiction became evident as Indian fee ownership 
of Indian lands became interspersed with non-Indian ownership. 31 
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PREEMPTION 

AND INFRINGEMENT STANDARDS 

In the past twenty years the Supreme Court has attempted to 
formulate a test for determining the extent of state jurisdiction 
within Indian territory. The Court developed two approaches: 
Preemption by federal action and infringement upon self-govern­
ment. State action must surmount both barriers. 
Williams v. Lee,32 a 1959 case, in\(olved a non-Indian proprie­
tor on the Navajo Reservation who sued a member of the tribe in 
the Arizona state courts for payment of a debt. 33 The Supreme 
26. F. COHEN, supra note 17, at 119. 
27. Id. at 121. 
28. Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898). 
29. Utah & Northern Ry. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885) (tax upheld on the 
grounds that it was not an interference with the federal duty of protection and that 
the right of way had been relinquished by the Indians); accord, Maricopa & Phoenix 
R.R. v. Arizona Territory, 156 U.S. 347 (1895). 
30. See notes 20-26 supra and accompanying text. 
31. See General Allotment Act, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (repealed by Indian Reor­
ganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1976)). The allotment period, from 1887 to 1934, had 
the effect of destroying the tribal entity. The General Allotment Act granted citizen­
ship to Indians who would take land allotments; divested the tribes of title to these 
parcels and transferred title to the citizen; and authorized sale of surplus reservation 
lands not allotted. Bean, The Limits of Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The Cornucopia 
of Inherent Powers, 49 N.D.L. REV. 303, 305-06 (1973). 
32. 358 U.S. 217 (1959). 
33. Id. at 217-18. 
720 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:715 
Court unanimously held that the exercise of jurisdiction by the 
Arizona court would undermine the authority of the tribal courts to 
deal with internal Indian matters.34 Thus, state jurisdiction would 
have interfered with one aspect of the tribe's inherent right to self­
government: To maintain authority over on-reservation disputes. 35 
Williams, while upholding tribal sovereignty, explained that 
the territorial approach did not have to be followed "where essen­
tial tribal relations were not involved and where the rights of Indi­
ans would not be jeopardized. . . . "36 State laws could be applied 
within Indian territory as long as they did not infringe on the right 
of tribal self-government.37 In holding that the general federal in­
terest was insufficient to prohibit state control, Williams upset the 
presumption of plenary federal control over Indian affairs. Al­
though Williams' infringement test required a balancing of state 
and tribal interests, the Court alluded to a preemption test in 
stating that the infringement test was applicable only "absent gov­
erning Acts of Congress. "38 
Williams confirmed that something had been taken away from . 
the Indians. The infringement test is based on the subject matter 
of the state action. It essentially did away with territorial analysis 
except in areas implicating internal tribal relations. 39 As a result, 
reservation boundaries have become blurred, their parameters de­
pendent on the nature of the state authority being asserted. 40 
The preemption analysis gained strength in Warren Trading 
Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission, a 1965 case which involved a 
state attempt to tax the proceeds of an Indian trading company.41 
The Court reviewed the specific statutes and regulations and using 
a typical preemption analysis, determined that Congress had 
occupied the field of Indian trading. 42 
34. ld. at 223. 
35. ld. 
36. ld. at 219. 
37. ld. 
38. ld. at 220 (citing Utah & Northern Ry. Co. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885)). 
39. The states seized upon Williams, interpreting it as a grant of state jurisdic­
tion unless there was an interference with tribal self-government. See, e.g., Organ­
ized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962). McClanahan v. Arizona Tax 
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973) clarified the applicability'of the Williams infringement 
test in situations where no tribal governmental interests were involved. The Court 
held that individual Indians had rights which were protectible under the standard. 
Id. at 181. 
40. Barsh, The Omen: Three Affiliated Tribes v. Moe and the Future of Tribal 
Self-Government, 5 AM. IND. L. REV. 1,6-7 (1977). 
41. 380 U.S. 685'(1965). 
42. ld. at 690-91. 
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In Kennerly v. District Court,43 the Court attempted to re­
solve the confusion between the application of the preemption 
analysis and the infringement test. The dispute, similar to Wil­
liams, involved a suit commenced in the state courts by a non­
Indian creditor against Indian residents for a debt incurred on the 
reservation. 44 The Court held that the state failed to act in accor­
dance with the procedural requirements of Public Law 28045 to ob­
tain jurisdiction. State action, therefore, was barred. 46 This decision 
caused considerable confusion because Public Law 280 had been en­
acted into law before Williams was decided. The Court therefore 
could have premised Williams on the same statutory basis it had 
used in Kennerly. Alternatively, the Kennerly Court, after estab­
lishing that the state had complied with Public Law 280, could have 
based its decision on the infringement test. Apparently, the Court 
was establishing the preemption test as the primary test to be ap­
plied to state jurisdiction disputes. 
The dominance of preemption analysis was recognized and re­
fined in 1973 by McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission. 47 
The dispute involved the application of Arizona's income tax to in­
come earned by Navajo Indians on the reserVation. The Court es­
tablished the preemption doctrine as the applicable mode of analy­
sis. Inherent sovereignty, no longer a complete bar to state action, 
was to be considered as a "backdrop against which the applicable 
treaties and federal statutes must be read. "48 The sovereignty back­
drop was the recognized right of the Indians to regulate their inter­
nal tribal affairs. A federal treaty and a state statute suggested that 
the Navajos were to be exempt from income tax. 49 These enact­
ments, when coupled with the backdrop of sovereignty, convinced 
the Court that the tribe had been exempted from state income 
taxes. 50 
43. 400 U.S. 423 (1973). In Kennerly, the Blackfeet Indian Tribe had adopted 
ordinances authorizing Montana to assume concurrent jurisdiction, unlike the Nava­
jos in Williams. ld. at 425. 
44. ld. at 424. 
45. See note 22 supra and accompanying text. 
46. 400 U.S. at 427-29. 
47. 411 U.S. 164 (1973). 
48. Id. at 172. 
49. Id. The Court interpreted the language of the Navajo treaty as creating an 
exemption from state taxes by relying on the canon of construction applicable in In­
dian law: "[d]oubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of [the Indians]." Id. at 
173-75. The Court also found that the language of the Arizona Enabling Act, 36 Stat. 
569, disclaiming jurisdiction over Indian lands, indicated a federal intent to exempt 
Indians from state taxation. Id. at 176. 
SO. Id. at 175. 
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The Court attempted to clarify the application of the infringe­
ment test by stating that it was not meant to apply to disputes 
involving all-Indian parties. 51 In those situations, the state could 
not claim a sufficient interest in asserting its jurisdiction, unlike sit­
uations involving non-Indians. The application of the infringement 
test, however, was muddled further in Fisher v. District Court, 52 
where the Court applied the infringement test to an adoption pro­
ceeding concerning all-Indian parties. 53 The McClanahan pre­
emption analysis also was used, and the Court emphasized the 
dominance of that analysis over the infringement test. 54 
The Court stated that there is, in effect, a trade off in the In­
dian preemption analysis. 55 Normally, preemption analysis inquires 
whether the federal government has divested the states of author­
ity. In Indian preemption analysis, however, the inquiry focuses on 
whether the federal government has granted power to the states to 
exert authority on Indian reservations. Because traditional notions 
of inherent sovereignty and federal policies that reflect these no­
tions are sufficient to invalidate state authority, the states' regula­
tory interests also must be considered. 56 In other preemption anal­
ysis the states' interests are subordinated to the overriding federal 
interest. 
Since McClanahan, the Court has recognized that a rigid rule 
cannot govern state jurisdictional disputes due to the hodgepodge 
of interests that must be considered. 57 The latc:)st pronouncements 
by the Court, however, accept a two-tier approach, preemption 
analysis and infringement. 58 State power is barred in two circum­
stances: When there is federal preemption, considered in light of 
inherent Indian sovereignty and, absent preemption, when tribal 
self-government is infringed. 59 The two standards are independent 
in that either is sufficient to defeat a state action. They are related 
in that the Indians' right to self-government is dependent on the 
will of Congress. Nevertheless, traditional notions of self-govern­
ment, so deeply embedded in the law, provide an important back­
51. Id.at179. 
52. 424 U.S. 382 (1976) (per curiam). 
53. Id. at 387-89. 
54. Id. at 386. 
55. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 100 S. Ct. 2578, 2584 (1980). 
56. Id. See also 411 U.S. at 171. 
57. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 100 S. Ct. 2578, 2583 (1980). 
58. E.g., id.; Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976). 
59. 100 S. Ct. at 2583. 
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drop against which federal statutes must be read. 60 Although the ex­
tent of state authority no longer depends on territorial boundaries, 
it has not been abandoned. The interests of the respective sover­
eignties take into account the territorial concerns. 61 Therefore, in 
each case it is necessary to balance the state's regulatory interest, 
the tribal stake in self-government, and the federal policies and 
legislation. 
IV. LEGACY OF MOE 
In the 1976 case of Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes,62 the 
balance between state and tribal jurisdiction was once more at is­
sue, this time in the context of the Montana cigarette sales tax. 
The state wanted to impose its tax on both Indians and non-Indians 
doing business in an on-reservation smokeshop.63 The Court used 
the preemption analysis of McClanahan to strike the tax as applied 
to Indians on Indian lands. 64 Since the tribe was under the control 
of Congress, the reservation was separate from the jurisdiction of 
the state and therefore not subject to taxation. 65 This comports 
with the notion that state taxation of Indians is a special area, per­
missible only when federal jurisdiction has been waived or a fed­
eral statute authorizes it. 66 
As to the application of the tax to non-Indians, the Court bal­
anced the competing tribal and state interests. The consumer, 
rather than the Indian retailer, reaped the benefit of the exemp­
tion. 67 When the consumer is a non-Indian, federal interest in pro­
tecting the tax-exempt status of the Indians is lacking. The Court 
recognized that the tribe had an economic interest in eliminating 
the state tax, for without the tax the Indians had a competitive ad­
60. Id. 
61. See 447 U.S. at 166-67 (Brennan, J., dissenting); note 21 supra and accom­
panying text. 
62. 425 U.S. 463 (1976). 
63. Id. at 466. 
64. Id. at 475-77. 
65. Id. at 475-76. 
66. Id. (quoting with approval Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 
148 (1973)). 
67. 425 U.S. at 481-82. This notion has been called absurd: "[fJor whose bene­
fit were these stores established? A pragmatist would certainly answer: for the bene­
fit of the owners! Because the owners are Indians, and the court admits, however 
obtusely, that the state tax depresses sales, reservation Indians do benefit from non­
Indians' tax immunity." Barsh, supra note 40, at 30-31. See note 100 infra and ac­
companying text. 
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vantage over non-reservation dealers.68 The Court, however, was 
unwilling to protect this interest when doing so would deprive the 
state of a legitimate tax base. 69 
The tribes argued that collection of the tax would interfere 
unjustifiably with tribal government because the Indian seller, in 
effect, was an involuntary agent for the state's tax collection. 7o The 
Supreme Court rejected the Indians' argument, reasoning that col­
lecting the tax was not equivalent to paying the tax. The state's ac­
tion, therefore, was not within the special area of state taxation 
requiring specific congressional consent. 71 The Court found neither 
a frustration of tribal government nor a specific statutory conflict 
that would invalidate the means that the state used to collect a val­
idly imposed sales tax. 72 
Moe clearly established that the state may, in certain circum­
stances, impose a nondiscriminatory tax on non-Indian business 
transactions on the reservation. It reinforced the current territorial­
ist view of the reservation; that is, reservation boundaries are rele­
vant solely to Indians and irrelevant to non-Indians when courts 
are determining the weight to be accorded the state's interest. 
In 1976, the Ninth Circuit also was presented with the issue of 
competing tribal and state taxes. The court, in Fort Mojave Tribe 
v. San Bernardino,73 declined to preempt a county possessory in­
terest tax that was levied on non-Indian lessees of Indian land de­
spite the existence of a similar tax imposed by the tribe. 74 No tax 
exemption was found to be mandated by the Indian Reorganization 
Act'5 despite Congress' intent to foster the economic development 
of the tribes. 76 The tax's dramatic economic impact on tribal devel­
opment did not persuade the court to strike it. Absent a specific 
statutory exemption for the reservation, the Ninth Circuit would 
68. 425 U.S. at 482. 
69. [d. 
70. [d. 
71. [d. at 483; see note 66 supra and accompanying text. 
72. [d. 
73. 543 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977). 
74. [d. at 1259. This case reaffinns the Ninth Circuit's decision in Aqua 
Caliente Band of Mission Indians v. County of Riverside, 442 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir. 
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 933 (1972). 
75. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1976). The purpose of the Act was to foster and en­
courage self-government of the Indian tribes. See notes 121-24 infra and accompa­
nying text. 
76. 543 F.2d at 1256. The court noted, however, that the California area of the 
reservation, which extended into three states, might be slowed in its development by 
the possessory tax. Id. at 1255. 
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not allow non-Indians to enjoy a tax exemption where Indians were 
only indirectly affected. The court reasoned that the state had rec­
ognized authority in revenue raising. 77 The infringement test was 
not a bar because "the uncertain economic burden ... imposed on 
the tribe's ability to levy a tax [did] not interfere with their right of 
self-government. "78 
A similar result was reached in Crow Tribe of Indians v. 
Montana. 79 The tribe had leased land to non-Indians to encourage 
the development of reservation coal resources. 80 The state's impo­
sition of a severance tax on the coal was upheld. First, the court 
found no interference with tribal self-government on the ground 
that the tax affected a non-Indian lessee and only had a "remote 
economic effect ... [on] the Tribe."81 The court then examined 
the second test, preemption. The court followed the Mojave rea­
soning, holding that the state tax had not been preempted by en­
actment of the tribal tax since the state did not prevent the tribe 
from levying its own tax. 82 
V. COLVILLE EXAMINED AND DISTINGUISHED 
Unlike the tribe in Moe, the Colville, Makah, and Lummi 
Tribes placed their own tribal tax on cigarette sales in the reserva­
tion smokeshops.83 The tribes enacted ordinances, approved by the 
Secretary of the Interior, which implemented a taxing scheme and 
regulated the smokeshops.84 The tribes bought the cigarettes from 
77. Id. at 1257. 
78. Id. at 1258. Fort Mojave, hDwever, has nDt gDne withDut criticism fDr its 
failure to. distinguish Moe: Fort Mojave invDlved a tribal tax while Moe did not. CDn­
federated Tribes Df the CDlville Indian ReservatiDn v. WashingtDn, 446 F. Supp. 
1339 (E.D. Wash. 1978). FDrt Mojave has also. been faulted fDr its failure to. balance 
the actual tribal interests at stake. NDte, Balancing the Interests in Tax of Non-
Indian Activities Dn Indian Lands, 64 IOWA L. REV. 1459, 1506 (1979). . 
79. 469 F. Supp. 154 (D. MDnt. 1979). 
80. Id. at 156. 
81. Id. at 162. 
82. Id. at 163-64. 
83. The CDlville Tribe maintained fDurteen smDkeshDps, the Lummi Tribe 
maintained six shDps, and the Makah Tribe maintained Dne shDp. Petitio.ner's Brief 
at 14, WashingtDn v. CDnfederated Tribes Df the CDlville Indian ReservatiDn, 447 
U.S. 134 (1980). 
84. 447 U.S. at 144. The Drdinances prDvided: 
(a) The tDbacco. products, including cigarettes, shall remain the pro.perty o.f 
the Tribe until So.ld to. the ultimate custDmer; 
(b) A Dealer shall first o.btain tribal and federal trader's licenses sUPPo.rted 
with adequate perso.n and property liability insurance cDverage Dn the Deal­
er's premises; 
(c) A Dealer shall nDt sell tDbacco. prDducts, including cigarettes, to. mino.rs, 
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out-of-state wholesalers and distributed the cigarettes to the reser­
vation tobacco outlets. 85 The dealers in those outlets were federally 
licensed Indian traders.86 After distribution to the outlets, the 
tribes collected the wholesale distribution price plus the tribal tax. 
The cigarettes remained the property of the tribe until resale. 87 
The tribal tax, forty to fifty cents per carton,88 raised signifi­
cant revenue. Between 1972 and 1976 the Colville Tribe raised ap­
proximately $266,000; the Lummi Tribe raised $54,000; and the 
Makah Tribe raised $13,000.89 The largest percentage of tribal cig­
arette sales was made to persons who came to the reservation to 
purchase at a discount price. 90 The state excise tax on the sales 
was $1.60 per carton so the purchaser saved more than $1.00 
per carton. 91 
Colville came to the Court in a significantly different posture 
than Moe for two reasons. The evidence showed that the imposi­
tion of the state tax would put the smokeshops out of business 
since ninety percent of their business was from nonresident con­
sumers.92 Moe, on the other hand, noted that smokeshop business 
would decrease as a result of the state tax, but there was no show­
ing that the shops would be eliminated.93 Second, the Colville 
tribes were actually involved in the financing, management, and 
taxing of the sales. The only people affected in Moe were the indi­
no more than a limited number of cartons of cigarettes per non-Indian sale; 
and 
(d) For violation penalties. 
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington, 446 F. Supp. 
1339,1347-48 (E.D. Wash. 1978), afI'd in part, rev'd in part, 447 U.S. 134 (1980). 
85. The wholesalers were also federally licensed Indian traders. 447 U.S. at 
144 n.18. 
86. [d. at 144. See Traders with Indians Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 261-264 (1976). The 
Traders with Indians Act has been interpreted as prohibiting the state from imposing 
any further burden on Indian traders because the federal government has preempted 
the state action. See Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 
(1965) (Arizona could not levy its income tax on Indian traders with respect to sales 
made to reservation Indians on the reservation). 
87. 447 U.S. at 144. 
88. [d. 
89. [d. 
90. Respondent's Brief at 11. Approximately ninety percent of the sales were 
made to non-Indians. 
91. 447 U.S. at 145. The state tax was imposed pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE 
§§ 82.24.020, 28A.47.440, 73.32.130 (1976). The state had been trying to tax the sales 
for nine years. Each tribe, during the pretrial development of the ultimate issues, en­
acted its own tribal ordinances and taxes. Record, Appendix, at 5-6. 
92. See note 90 supra. 
93. 447 U.S. at 158. 
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vidual traders, but in Colville the tribes were involved in the en­
terprise as an entity and would be affected by state assumption of 
jurisdiction. 
The district court concluded that the Washington cigarette tax 
could not be applied to an on-reservation transaction on the ground 
that the state's action had been preempted by the tribal taxing or­
dinances. 94 As an alternative ground, the court found that the 
state's tax impermissibly interfered with tribal self-government. 95 
Because the tribal tax was used to finance government functions 
and services, imposition of the state tax would eliminate the reve­
nue necessary to carry on those functions. 96 
Justice White, writing for the Supreme Court majority,97 re­
versed the decision. Mter rejecting Washington's argument that ju­
risdiction was improper,98 the Court turned to the preliminary 
substantive issue, the power of the Indians to tax non-Indians. The 
tribal taxes were upheld as valid because no federal interest was 
sufficient to extinguish the tribes' retained power to levy taxes. 99 
As to the imposition of state taxes, the Court deferred to the dis­
trict court's determination that the non-Indian bore the burden of 
the tax. lOO The Court, in its preemption examination, recognized 
the economic hardship that the dual taxation scheme would cause 
the tribes because of lost business and lost tax revenue. lOl Never­
94. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington, 446 
F. Supp. 1339, 1360-61 (E.D. Wash. 1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 447 U.S. 134 
(1980). 
95. [d. at 1362. 
96. [d. at 1363. 
97. Justice White was joined by Justices Burger, Powell, Blackmun, and 
Stevens. 
98. The state argued that jurisdiction was not proper because the court had not 
followed the intricacies of the now repealed statute governing three-judge district 
courts (28 U.S.C. § 2281 (repealed 1976)). 447 U.S. at 145. The statute did not re­
quire a three-judge court if the state statute challenge was grounded in the Suprem­
acy Clause or if the constitutional claims were insubstantial. The original complaints 
contended that there was both a Supremacy Clause claim as well as a violation of the 
Indian Commerce Clause. [d. at 146-47. The Court rejected the state's argument that 
the latter claim was insubstantial. [d. at 147-48. 
99. 447 U.S. at 152-54. 
100. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington, 
446 F. Supp. 1339, 1354-55 (E.D. Wash. 1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 447 U.S. 
134 (1980). See note 67 supra. See also Mescalero Apache Tribe v. O'Chesky, 625 
F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1980) (burden of tax fell on non-Indian contractor despite con­
tractual agreement to indemnify contractor for taxes paid); Vending Unlimited, Inc. 
v. Florida, 364 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 1978) (excise tax assessed on the privilege of dealing 
in cigarettes, therefore, burden of the tax falls on the Indian dealer). 
101. 447 U.S. at 154-55. 
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theless, the Court refused to recognize any principle of federal In­
dian law that authorized the tribes to market their tax exemption to 
non-Indians or to Indians who were not members of the tribe. 102 
To preempt a valid state tax collection the Court required a more 
precise argument than the mere assertion that federal policy en­
courages economic development of Indian reservations. 103 
The Court then rejected the basis of the Indians' second argu­
ment against the assertion of state authority, interference with 
, tribal government. To assess the impact on the tribal governments, 
the Court balanced the tribal interests in raising revenue against 
the state's interest. The tribal interests were considered to be less­
ened significantly because most cigarette purchasers were non­
Indian and did not receive any of the services funded by the tribal 
tax revenues. 104 
Justice Rehnquist, concurring in part, arrived at the same re­
sult on the cigarette tax issue through the McClanahan preemption 
approach, which requires no balancing of the state and tribal inter­
ests. 10S Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the tradition, or backdrop, 
of sovereignty was one of no' tribal immunity because the state 
, sought to regulate' a nonmember Indian. He searched the relevant 
statutes fora suggestion that Congress intended to prevent states 
from taxing Indian cigarette sales and found none. lOS 
A separate opinion by Justice Brennan,107 dissenting in part, 
viewed the s~ate's interest as minimal when weighed against the 
tribes' interest, in protecting their economic base and commercial 
develop~ent. Justice Brennan considered the state tax, which com­
pet~d with the tribal tax, a' burden on the Indians' right to self­
government within their reservation. 108 Three factors convinced 
, the dissent to disallow a state tax: It would reduce tribal revenue; it 
would place smokeshops at an actual competitive disadvantage; and 
it would allow the state to regulate subject matter that the tribes 
had chosen to regulate. 109 
Justice Stewart indicated a third approach.1l0 He would have 
102. ld. at 155-56. 
103. ld. 
104. ld. at 156-57. 
105. ld. at 177. 
106. ld. at 186-87. 
107. Justice Brennan was joined by Justice Marshall in dissenting. 
108. 447 U.S. at 170-7l. 
109. ld. 

,1lO. ld. at 174 (Stewart, J., concurring & dissenting). 
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required the states to credit the tribal tax against the state tax due. 
Under his analysis, the tribes enjoy the same power to tax as the 
states. Therefore, the tribe would collect its tax, and the state 
would receive the difference between the state and tribal taxes. 111 
This method would place on-reservation and off-reservation prod..: 
ucts on an' equal footing, protecting both the tribal and state reve­
nues. 112 
VI., REPERCUSSIONS 
The smokeshops on the Colville, Lummi, ar:td Makah Reserva­
tions, unlike the smokeshops in Moe, the leasing in Mojave, or the 
coal production in CrQw Tribe,' would he put out of business by 
the imposition ofa ,state, tax. This is not a case of a potential or un­
•certain economic burden, 	nor are the tribes only marginally af;. 
fected. The courts have recognized tribal economic interests and n­
nances as worthy of protection. 113 The limit to which the courts are 
'willing to protect these tribal interests, however, appears to have 
.been reached in Colville. 
A. Tribal Power to Tax 
The power to tax has been recognized as one of the Indian 
tribes' retained powers, even if assessed against a nonmember. 
This principle was relied upon in Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux 
Tribe,114 a dispute involving tribal taxation on the privilege of graz-
IlL Id. at 174-76. 
112. Id. at 174-75. 
113. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) for an inter­
esting interpretation of what constitutes economic development. The Court rejected 
an equal protection challenge brought by a female member of the tribe who married 
outside the tribe. A tribal ordinance prohibited her children from becoming tribal 
members. Membership, however, was not denied to children born of a mixed mar­
riage when the father was a tribal member. One of the reasons the Court gave for 
denying her suit was that the costs of litigation would impose serious financial bur­
dens on "already 'financially disadvantaged' tribes." Id. at 64. Although the decision 
protects tribal self-government and the sovereign right to define membership in the 
tribe, it will also cause a loss of tribal membership as well as the alienation of 
women from the tribal unit. 
114. 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956). See also Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 
1905), appeal dismissed, 203 U.S. 599 (1906) (court upheld the imposition of a tax on 
all persons who were not members of the tribe trading within its boundaries); Morris 
v. Hitchcock, 21 App. D.C. 565 (1903), afI'd, 194 U.S. 384 (1904) (court upheld a 
tribal tax on cattle owned by nonmembers that grazed on private land within the 
tribal boundaries); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir.), cert. 
granted, 101 S. Ct. 71 (1980) (tribe had inherent power to tax nonmembers engaged 
in severing oil and gas from tribal lands). 
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ing stock on the reservation: "[i]nasmuch as it has never been 
taken from it, the . . . Tribe possesses the power of taxation which 
is an inherent incident of its sovereignty. "115 Tribal exercise of a 
retained power is valid as long as it is not overshadowed by a fed­
eral interest. These federal interests have been identified as foreign 
affairs, 116 alienation of lands to non-Indians without federal 
consent,117 and the prosecution of non-Indians without the civil 
rights protections afforded in state and federal trials. 11S In Colville 
no federal interests were impinged, although taxation by the tribe 
is not considered to be a retained power when it interferes with 
the federal government's ability to tax. In that situation the federal 
government's interests would prevail. 119 
The retained power of taxation120 allowed the Colville tribes to 
tax nonmember consumers. Theoretically, the tribes do retain the 
power, although it may be useless. If a state tax is imposed on 
goods then a tribal tax, which would cause a further increase in 
price, .would not be placed or received on the goods: the tribe has 
retained the power but the power is useless. 
B. Federal Preemption 
The objective of federal Indian policy has been to encourage 
economic development and to strengthen tribal government, 
U5. 231 F.2d at 99. 
U6. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) I, 17-18 (1831). 
U7. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1832). 
U8. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, on remand sub nom. 
Oliphant v. Schlie, 573 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1978). This case involved a non-Indian 
who had been charged with assault of an Indian chief during a tribal ceremony. The 
tribe argued that section 16 of the Indian Reorganization Act confirmed the Indians' 
power to try the non-Indians on criminal charges. See notes 100-05 supra and accom­
panying text. The Court, however, rejected the argument on the ground that the stat­
ute neither confirmed nor addressed the issue. ld. at 195 n.6. In a sense, the argu­
ment for retention of exclusive tribal power should be stronger in Oliphant than in 
the taxing cases because of the importance given to the tribal courts in the federal 
scheme. See, e.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 222-23 (1959). The Court in Oli­
phant, however, concerned with the difference between state and federal criminal 
courts and the tribal criminal courts, wanted to protect the civil rights of citizens. 435 
U.S. at 210. Furthermore, Oliphant does not purport to limit the tribe's exercise of 
civil and regulatory jurisdiction. ld. 
U9. 447 U.S. at 153-54. The decision was reinforced by the observation that 
"[tlhe widely held understanding within the Federal Government has always been 
that federal law to date has not worked a divestiture of Indian taxing power." ld. 
120. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 101 S. Ct. 71 (1980). The power to tax is a retained power only when the 
federal government's ability to tax would n~t be impaired. The Court rejected the 
national interest in free and open trade as insufficient in these circumstances to over­
come the Indian's authority. ld. at 542. 
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freeing the tribes from undue influence by outside forces. 121 The 
policy has been expressed in the Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934122 and in other congressional enactments. 123 The intent of 
these acts has been "to rehabilitate the Indian's economic life and 
to give him a chance to develop the initiative destroyed by a cen­
tury of oppression and paternalism."124 The Colville dispute dem­
onstrates the need for this federal policy. Each of the tribes is iso­
lated, underdeveloped, and plagued by unemployment. 125 
The courts, however, have followed a trend denying pre­
emptive force to assertions of federal policy even when off-reser­
vation tribal activities or non-Indian activities on the reservation 
promise to benefit the tribe. 126 For example, an off-reservation 
ski resort was not exempt from state taxation even though the 
enterprise was built near the Mescalero Reservation. 127 Despite the 
Court's recognition that the purpose of federal policy is to encour­
age Indians to take control of their business, and despite a stat­
ute that could easily have been read to give an explicit exemption, 
the resort's off-reservation location determined the outcome. 128 
In this respect, Colville follows the present trend in 
preemption disputes: the Court gave little weight to the federal 
policy of encouraging tribal economic development when non­
Indians bore the burden of the state tax. Thus, the state's interest 
is increased and the tribal interest is correspondingly decreased 
when non-Indians pay the disputed tax even though the activity is 
taking place on the reservation. A mere expression of policy will 
121. H. R. REP. No. 1804, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1934) (quoted with approval 
in Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 152 (1973)). 
122. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-486 (1976). 
123. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 
450-458e (1975); Indian Financing Act of 1974,25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1543 (1976). 
. 124. H.R. REP. No. 1804, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934). See also S. REP. No. 
1080, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934) (Senator Wheeler). 
125. Appendix to Jurisdictional Statement, 4-5. The Colville Reservation has a 
33% unemployment rate and the Makah Reservation has a 60% unemployment rate. 
126. See text accompanying notes 20-30 supra. 
127. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 156-57 (1973). 
128. See 25 U.S.C. § 465 (1976) which provides a tax exemption for lands and 
rights acquired under the Indian Reorganization Act [hereinafter referred to as 
I.R.A.]. Although the land was leased from the Forest Service in accordance with the 
I.R.A. and the rent was paid with federal funds, the majority held that the tribe en­
joyed no blanket exemption from taxes when the enterprise was off the reservation 
lands. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 156-57 (1973). As Justice 
Douglas noted in his dissent, however, "[t]here is no more convincing way to tax 
'rights' in land than to impose an income tax on the gross net income from those 
rights." Id. at 162. 
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not defeat the state's interest. Rather, the courts require specific 
federal regulation of the subject matter. Therefore, a specific fed­
eral prohibition against state taxation of non-Indians on the reserva­
tion is necessary to oust the state. On the other hand, the taxation 
of Indians on the reservation requires specific federal authorization. 
Even when such federal regulation· exists, Indian preemption anal­
ysis requires consideration of the state's interest to determine if it 
interferes with implementation of federal policies. 129 In cases of 
competing federal and state concerns, the state interest in revenue 
raising, without any corresponding regulatory interest, is an insuffi­
cient basis upon which to assert authority. 130 
The preemption argument becomes more compelling when 
tribal ordinances regulate the same subject matter as the state 
laws. The Colville majority, however, disagreed: 
[f]inally, although the Tribes themselves could perhaps pre-empt 
state taxation through the exercise of properly delegated federal 
power to do so, . . . we do not infer from the mere fact of fed­
eral approval of the Indian taxing ordinances, or from the fact 
that the Tribes exercise congressionally sanctioned powers of 
self-government, that Congress has delegated the far-reaching 
authority to pre-empt valid state sales and cigarette taxes other­
wise collectible from nonmembers of the Tribe. l3l 
Section 16 of the Indian Reorganization Act delegates to tribal 
government those powers that have "vested in any Indian Tribe or 
tribal council by existing law. "132 Section 16 has been used to au­
thorize tribal ordinances giving jUrisdiction to the tribal courts over 
adoption proceedings in which all the parties are tribal mem­
bers.133 Because ordinances were authorized by section 16, they 
implemented an overriding federal policy in self-government which 
was adequate to defeat state jurisdiction. 134 Therefore, even if an 
exercise of state jurisdiction could have been permitted, tribal ac­
tion preempted it,135 Similarly, one federal court recognized that a 
state fishing law Could conflict with a tribal ordinance regulating 
129. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 100 S. Ct. 2578, 2583 (1980). 
See text accompanying notes 55 & 56 supra. 
130. White Moutain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 100 S. Ct. 2578, 2587 (1980). 
131. 447 U.S. at 156. 
132. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1976). 
133. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 389 (1976). 
134. [d. at 390. 
135. [d. 
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the same subject matter if there was a "clear manifestation" of 
tribal intent to preempt state regulation. 13S 
C. The Infringement Test 
When the Colville Court applied the infringement test it 
found that a state tax would interfere only minimally with tribal 
government. 137 The Court's conclusion is troubling. Concurrent 
taxation will cause a tremendous interference with tribal self­
government. Indeed, this is a real intrusion which will impact on 
both the tribal government and members. ' 
The courts found an interference with tribal self-government 
when the states sought to regulate governmental activities,138 fam:" 
ily life,139 civil proceedings,140 and extradition proceedings on the 
reservation. 141 But nothing hits closer to the heart of government 
than the ability to tax. 
Taxation has always been considered an e,ssential aspect of 
government from which power and control are derived: "[a] right 
to tax is a right to destroy. "142 Colville demonstrates the validity of 
this statement. State taxation either will destroy tribal smokeshops 
and thus eliminate a major source of revenue because of lack of 
business or will cause tribes to decide it is no longer feasible to 
impose taxes on state-taxed commodities, In any event, tribal gov­
ernment will be unable to raise revenue in the manner it wishes. A 
government which cannot raise its own funds for governmental 
functions and services is not much of a governmept. , 
The district court noted that "the revenue generated by the 
taxes to date has been devoted to the partial funding of programs 
such as day care, education, nutrition, fire protection and alcohol­
ism of reservation people. "143 Thus, the revenue that the tribes 
136. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington, 
591 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1979). See note 140 infra. 
137. Id. at 91. 
138. E.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n.32 (1978) (an as~ 
pect of self-government is the determination of membership in that government). 
139. See Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976). 
140. E.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). 
141. Arizona ex reI. Merrill v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. den,ied, 
396 U.S. 1003 (1970). 
142. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 347 (1819). In a more relevant con­
text, Indian taxation, Felix Cohen stated: "[olne of the powers essential to the main­
tenance of any government is the power to levy taxes." F. COHEN, supra note 17, at 
142. 
143. .Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington, 
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raised for these services correspondingly reduced the state's bur­
den to supply them. l44 The tax was a means of improving the eco­
nomic well-being, education, and social welfare of the tribal mem­
bers. Further, many of the tribal services were used by non-Indian 
residents of the reservation. If the tribe could no longer assume 
the burden, the responsibility to provide services for these individ­
uals would revert to the state. 145 
The Court refused to grant a tax haven to the purchaser by al­
lowing state jurisdiction over nonmember buyers. 146 This is a 
compelling argument when considered in conjunction with the 
state's need to raise revenues. The Court showed the same concern 
in Moe, the 1976 cigarette tax dispute, regarding the state's ability 
to raise money where the tribe had not taken action to regulate or 
tax the smokeshops.147 The Colville Indians' perspective is quite 
different, however, since the state tax forces them to choose be­
tween commercial development and tax revenue, a choice not 
present in Moe. The dissent considered this dilemma to be an in­
terference with tribal government. 148 To avoid a competitive disad­
vantage, that is, charging the state tax plus the tribal tax, the tribe 
will be forced either to forego any tribal cigarette tax or to allow 
.concurrent taxation in their smokeshops. If the tribe chooses the 
latter, non-Indian customers as well as nonmember Indian custom­
ers will be lost to the off-reservation shops. 
The majority did not examine the practical effects of taxation 
on the tribal government but merely focused on the tribal interest 
in taxation as a means of population and economic regulation. 149 As 
a result, Colville may not permit state interference when the tribal 
interests go beyond mere revenue raising and include a regulatory 
function. 150 State interference would not be allowed when the state 
446 F. Supp. 1339, 1361 (E.D. Wash. 1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 447 U.S. 134 
(1980). 
144. Id. at 1362. 
145. Forty-six percent of the Colville Reservation population consisted of mem­
ber Indians and 63% of the total Makah Reservation consisted of tribal members. Pe­
titioner's Brief for Jurisdiction at 22. 
146. 447 U.S. at 155. 
147. See notes 62-72 supra and accompanying text. 
148. 447 U.S. at 168 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He saw the choice as causing a 
conflict in the dual federal policies of self-government and commercial development. 
Id. 
149. Id. at ·158-59. 
150. Id. In this situation, the state action may have a problem in meeting either 
the preemption test or Williams' infringement test. 
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tax either conflicted with or hindered the tribe's regulation of its 
enterprises. 151 
Moe determined that the tribes' interests are outweighed by 
the state's regulation of non-Indian activity on the reservation. 
Colville has taken Moe one step further by determining that the 
tribes' interests are no greater when the tribes have imposed their 
own tax. The tribe's actual use of its taxing power, however, should 
not be a consideration in the balancing of interests. Nonuse of the 
taxing power can be just as effective to the tribe as a social engi­
neering tool and as a means of regulating economic development. 
Thus, there can be a governmental determination not to tax. Nev­
ertheless, it is questionable whether the courts would consider the 
absence of a tax without an obvious regulatory function which 
could be an essential element of tribal self-government. 152 
Further, the preemption of state taxing jurisdiction by a tribal 
tax could be an even greater infringement on tribal self-gov­
ernment. The state could be in control of taxing decisions by 
levying a state tax, forcing the tribes to counter it with a tax to oust 
the state. 153 Thus, the state would be able to dictate tribal taxing 
decisions. In the situation created by Colville, however, the tribes 
are without a practical choice. 
The majority argued that the tax haven would be extended be­
yond conceivable notions. Although it may be idealistic to rely on 
the Indian tribes' present self-restraint in the taxing realm,154 there 
151. [d. See also Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. 
Washington, 591 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1979). 
The court stated that absent a "clear manifestation" of tribal intent to preempt, 
the state is not precluded from imposing its fishing regulations. The tribal regula­
tions did not show the "clear manifestation" to preempt the state laws: Tribal regula­
tions did not specifY that state laws would never apply; state jurisdiction would not 
hinder the objectives of the regulations; and some tribal regulations paralleled the 
state's regulations. Id. at 91. Thus, a scheme of joint tribal-state regulation was 
permitted by the tribe's own regulations. [d. at 92. 
152. See, e.g., Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 
(1976). 
153. Israel & Smithson, Indian Taxation, Tribal Sovereignty and Economic De­
velopment, 49 N.D. L. REV. 267, 280-81 (1973). 
154. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington, 
446 F. Supp. 1339, 1362 (E.D. Wash. 1978), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 447 U.S. 134 
(1980). The Indians demonstrated a concern with the amount of tax exempt sales 
made to nonmembers. One of the regulations placed a three-carton limit on non­
Indian purchases. Brief for Appellee at 8. There was no showing, however, that this 
regulation was enforced effectively. Nor was there evidence indicating whether the 
three-carton limit was merely a means to show concern over the amount of tax ex­
empt sales. 
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are checks on the Indian tribes' authority. For example, all taxing / 
ordinances must be approved by the Secretary of the Interior.l5s 
In addition, Congress may remove the Indian tribes' power to levy 
a tax at any time, or it may give the state explicit jurisdiction. 
Colville also complicated tax-exempt sales to tribal members. 
Moe allowed the states to collect state taxes through tribal mem­
bers if the state recordkeeping requirements were directed at non­
Indians. ls6 Normally, on-reservation jurisdiction over Indians is 
permitted only with congressional authorization. ls7 Moe granted 
on-reservation jurisdiction to the state without such approval be­
cause the non-Indian individual is on the reservation. lss Colville 
now allows the state direct involvement in tax-exempt sales by 
permitting the state to require Indian traders to keep detailed re­
cords of tax-exempt sales, facilitating the state's collection pro­
cess. lS9 
One means to avoid interference in tribal self-government by 
the state's taxes and recordkeeping requirements would be to place 
the burden of collection on the state and the non-Indian purchaser. 
The state may collect the tax directly from the buyer if the Indian 
seller does not collect the tax. l60 Thus, Washington could collect 
the tax directly from the purchaser after the non-Indian has left the 
reservation and is solidly within the state's jurisdiction. There are, 
however, serious problems with this approach. First, the tribal 
business will still be decreased. Second, this approach would cause 
a substantial interference with civil rights; allowing the state to 
monitor tax collection would encourage the state to search vehicles 
for contraband as the vehicles leave the reservation. Third, it 
would cause continual state surveillance around the border area. 
Against the background of state and tribal interests in sover­
eignty, revenue, competitive advantages, and commercial enter­
155. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington, 
446 F. Supp. 1339, 1362 (E.D. Wash. 1978), afI'd in part, rev'd in part, 447 U.S. 134 
(1980). 
156. 425 U.S. at 482-83. 
157. See notes 26-29 supra and accompanying text. 
158. 425 U.S. at 481-83. 
159. 447 U.S. at 159-60. The requirements include: Recording and retaining for 
state inspection the names of all Indian purchasers, their tribal affiliations, the reser­
vation within which the sales were made, the dollar amount of the sales, and the 
date of the sales. I d. 
160. WASH. REV. CODE AI'.'N. § 82.24.020 (1976 & West Cum. Supp. 1981): the 
tax is levied "upon the sale, use, consumption, handling, possession or distribution 
of all cigarettes ...." 
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prises, Justice Stewart's proposal for a tax credit seems to be the 
most reasonable approach. 161 By allowing the tribes to recoup their 
share of the state tax paid,162 both the tribal and state interests 
would be served. If the proposal were adopted, neither on-reserva­
tion nor off-reservation shops would find themselves with a state­
imposed price disadvantage. 163 The tax-credit approach allows the 
tribes to collect revenues while preventing the nonmember tax 
dodger from reaping the benefits. 164 
The practical result of a tax credit in Colville, however, would 
be much the same as concurrent taxation. The smokeshops' busi­
ness will diminish greatly because there no longer would be any 
incentive to buy cigarettes on the reservation. 16S Nevertheless, 
when the enterprise was not created and is not sustained solely by 
the tax exemption, as in Colville, 166 the tax credit would protect 
both interests. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
There has always been a tension between states and tribal gov­
ernments; both are protective of their power and their territory. 
This is especially evident in the area of taxation because Indians 
are immune from state taxation due to their federal status. The 
states desire a narrow reading of the tax exemptions so that they 
may collect revenue from non-Indians within the reservation. The 
Indians, on the other hand, prefer an expansive application of tax 
immunities within reservation boundaries so that they may gain the 
fullest benefit from their tax-exempt status. 
The Colville Court's primary consideration in permitting state 
tax~tion of tribal smokeshops was to prevent the creation of reser­
vation tax havens for nonmembers of the tribe. Moe had previously 
allowed the state to iinpose a tax on reservation sales to non­
Indians. Colville extended the state's taxing power to a situation 
161. See text accompanying notes 110-12 supra for Justice Stewart's approach. 
162. See notes 111 & 112 supra and accompanying text. 
163. 447 U.S. at 174-75 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
164. ld. 
165. ld. at 157-58. The Court noted that the tribes failed to show the expected 
decrease in sales to nonmember reservation dwellers. ld. The tribes will always 
have a loeational disadvantage. Petitioner's Brief at 21. 
166. 447 U.S. at 145. "In short, the Indian retailer's business is to a substantial 
degree dependent upon his tax-exempt status ...." ld. "[The] market existed in the 
first place only because of a claimed exemption from these very taxes. The taxes un­
der consideration do not burden commerce that would exist on the reservation with­
out respect to the tax exemption." ld. at 157. 
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where the tribes already regulated and taxed their own businesses. 
The right to regulate and tax business is a federally protected right. 
Unfortunately, Colville demonstrates that a state tax can impair res­
ervation businesses and destroy the effectiveness of the tribal gov­
ernment's regulatory and taxation schemes and still be upheld by 
the Supreme Court. Colville deprives Indian tribes of the right to 
challenge state taxation of non-Indians on the reservation unless 
the tribe is legitimately regulating an enterprise and the state tax 
would hinder implementation of the tribal regulation. This destroys 
tribal sovereignty. 
The Court's reluctance to condone tax havens that deny the 
state significant amounts of revenue is understandable. Imposing a 
state tax on top of an existing tribal tax, however, will do nothing 
to promote tribal economic development. This dual taxation 
scheme clearly will hamper sales since it eliminates any incentive 
to buy cigarettes on the reservation. In practice, the state tax actu­
ally defeats the state's own interests because the decrease in tribal 
revenue and the concomitant decrease in funding for social services 
will increase the state's costs of serving tribal needs. By ignoring 
the severe economic repercussions of the state tax, Colville essen­
tially barred actual infringement as a ground for invalidating state 
taxing authority over non-Indians on the reservation. In doing so 
the Court mistakenly failed to recognize that a tribe's financial wel­
fare is integral to its sovereignty. 
Ellen C. Brown 
